Uncle Thor's Magazine Online

The Japanese culture places great emphasis on doctrines and policies. Once a procedure is officially accepted, it will be implemented vigorously. Even when facts show that a policy is flawed, the Japanese tend to stick with it. They take a doctrine with a religious zeal which is surprising to Westerners.

In a 1933 military manual, Japanese strategists gave their impression of the Russian army. They stated that the Russian forces were unsophisticated and incapable of employing complex battle plans. Further, the Russians stubbornness made them tenacious defenders. The Japanese army took this manual as doctrine.

Other doctrines were also in play. Lacking energy sources, the Japanese Army was developed as an infantry rather than heavily mechanized force. Japan had tanks and some heavy artillery, but these were intended to support the infantry. The infantry army was perfect for Asia. It did not need excessive qualities of fuel to drive it, and it was more than adequate to take on most other Asian armies.

To compensate for the dearth of heavy mechanized equipment, the Japanese developed a concept of “fighting spirit.” The infantry expressed this by starting attacks with firearms until they could close and finish with bayonets. An aggressiveness that bordered on suicidal was championed among Japanese troops. The Japanese high command felt that adequate fighting spirit could overcome even the most highly mechanized enemy.

Japanese doctrine claimed that troops could operate up to 200 kilometers from a major supply depot (railhead, port, etc.). For a short time, this could be extended to 250 KM. Convinced that they were a superior army, the Japanese felt that no other army could exceed this distance.

There was one other Japanese strategy. The concept held by Japanese leaders was that a quick, hard attack would so demoralize an enemy to the point that they would sue for peace. This “soketsu” strategy was integral to Japanese strategic planning.

In 1938, the Japanese and Russian forces clashed at Lake Khasan. A Japanese surprise attack drove Soviet forces from the border, but a Russian counterattack sent them back to their original positions. Both sides claimed victory. Rather the question the effectiveness of the Russian counterattack, the Japanese wrote it off as a fluke.

The Russians and Japanese again clashed at Nomonhan in 1939. The Japanese had an initial gain, but were driven back by Soviet tanks. Over he next month, the battle degenerated into a group of raids and air attacks. Japan felt sure the Russians would not be able to adequately supply their forces, as their nearest supply base was a railhead more then 250 km away. They were sure the Russians would apply only the crudest type attacks. Japanese fighting spirit would more than compensate for the Soviet armor advantage, so they thought.

The Russians slowly built up their forces for a month. Convoys brought fuel, ammunition, soldiers and tanks over long distances. The Soviets had a lot of convoy experience in Siberia. While the Russians and Japanese sparred back and forth, a Soviet knockout punch was being put into place. The Russian force had more than doubled in size.

When the Russians launched their main attack, its effect was overwhelming. The plan was to send a large force to attack Hill 733 in the north, and several smaller attacks along the line. These were “fixing” attacks to keep the Japanese in place. Once that was done, a major armored assault would be launched from the south to break the Japanese lines and come behind them. This was a complex attack that demanded precision.

The actual attack was devastating. Expecting only frontal charges, the Japanese were overwhelmed as much by the Russians as by their own battlefield myopia. The attack on Hill 733 was supposed to keep the Japanese pinned down, but it managed to utterly crush the defenses. The assault from the south was devastating. By the time it was all over, the Japanese had a whopping 76% casualty rate. A division and a half of Japanese and Manchurian troops were sent running in total disarray.

While some Japanese generals wanted to send three more infantry divisions to the area, cooler heads sought a truce. A Russian rout of remaining Japanese forces in Manchuria would have cut off crucial natural resources and endangered Japanese units fighting the Chinese.

What of soketsu? The Japanese had hit hard and fast, but the Russians didn’t sue for peace. They hit back.

A Western army might have rethought itself if it had been in Japan’s position at Nomonhan. It would have moved toward mechanization, abandoned the “soketsu” concept and revised its opinion of the enemy. A good general always expects the enemy to put its best foot forward. Napoleon himself said, :Always expect the best intentions of your enemy.” The Japanese regarded their enemies as inferior. They paid the price for it.

Nomonhan should have been a wake-up call for Japanese strategy. Instead, the Japanese stuck with doctrine. They tried soketsu at Pearl Harbor. Instead of suing for peace, the United States fought back. As the American offensives progreessed, Japanese officers frustrated by overwhelming American attacks fell back on “fighting spirit.” They launched banzai charges whose only real effect on Americans was the expenditure of ammunition. The invariable result was a pile of Japanese troops cut down in mid-charge. From 1942 to 1945, American forces moved steadily toward Japan. The irony is that the U.S. treated the Pacific campaign as secondary until 1945. Less than 10% of US ground forces were involved in defeating the Japanese. By holding to doctrine, Japan made itself more vulnerable.

The Japanese experience is a clear example of what happens when doctrine is given precedence over necessity. Policies have their uses, but they have their limitations. Japan treated its policies as immutable law. When these proved ineffective, they were not revised. The policies were enacted with redoubled emphasis. However, the extra effort could not force the issue. Failed policies contributed to larger failures.

Heathenism, Wicca and other Pagan traditions are not written in stone. We have old lore that has been preserved. However, we do not apply it the same way Christians apply their scriptures. Our lore is a guide, not an ironclad law. Likewise, as we develop policies for our various groups, we need to think more of guidelines rather than doctrines. Hard and fast rules would be inhibit rather than help.

Flexibility is one of our strengths. We have not sold our freedom for a dogma that determines our actions. Instead, we have the ability to adapt, adjust, and keep moving forward. This is an important thing for us to retain. By keeping our doctrines and policies amenable to necessity, we are free of rigid barriers that stifle us.

The other lesson of the Japanese is in their attitude toward others. The Japanese arrogantly thought that others were incapable of matching their standards. They applied strategies based on doctrines that were at variance with human nature. By underestimating their opponents, the Japanese were surprised and overwhelmed. Rather than face a poorly-organized, poorly supplied, understrength force as they expected, the Japanese were battered by a Russian Thurs Rune that was cohesive, organized, well-supplied and numerically superior. Had the Japanese respected their opponents, they would have been much better prepared for the Russian onslaught.

We need remember that people will do their best when the stakes are high. Also, what counts as low stakes for you may be high for them. By regarding others as capable, we are less likely to be surprised. Our success in any endeavor is contingent on our willingness to think clearly. That includes making a realistic assessment of others.

The battlefield myopia of Japan is cultural. Vestiges of it survive today. The rise of Japanese business in the 70s crashed in the 80s due to arrogance about competition and rigid adherence to doctrine. We can learn from it. By seeing how such a mentality hamstrings an enterprise, we are better capable of retaining our flexibility.

A little “wisdom of the streets” for those who would learn. There are people who are not very bright. They might be dense, or stupid, or even slow. You might think them too dull to amount to much. That may be true, but they may still get one past you. Dull folks learn that what they cannot get with brains, they can get by cunning. They count on you. If you think they are stupid, you do not expect them to trick you.

It does not take much intelligence to be sneaky. A lie at the right time is all a person needs. Sometimes a simple plan will do it. Consider that many of those who plan to be sneaky will spend time thinking up a plan. The time you or I might spend thinking about work is time that others spend thinking up plans.

As it is said,” They may be dum, but that doesn’t mean they can’t be sneaky.”

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